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Abstract
This paper presents a theoretical framework analysing the signalling channel of ex-
change rate interventions as an informational trigger. We develop an implicit target
zone framework with learning in order to model the signalling channel. The theo-
retical premise of the model is that interventions convey signals that communicate
information about the exchange rate objectives of central bank. The model is used to
analyse the impact of Japanese FX interventions during the period 1999 -2011 on the
yen/US dollar dynamics.
Keywords: Exchange rates, interventions, Japan
JEL-Classification: C61, E58, F31
∗Economic Studies, School of Business, University of Dundee, y.f.chen@dundee.ac.uk
†Department of Economics, Hamburg University, and CESifo, Munich, funke@econ.uni-hamburg.de
‡Department of Economics, Hamburg University, Nicole.Glanemann@wiso.uni-hamburg.de
1 Introduction
Since the introduction of a flexible exchange rate regime in Spring 1973, the Japanese
yen has experienced large fluctuations, with the yen on a rising trajectory. In order to
mitigate the impact of such fluctuations on the Japanese economy and in order to help
push economic growth into positive territory, foreign exchange market interventions with
the aim of influencing exchange rates have been conducted from time to time. These
interventions are executed by the Bank of Japan on behalf of the Japanese Minister of
Finance.1
Between April 1991 and 2010, the Bank of Japan intervened on 350 days against the US
dollar, often on a massive scale and in a unilateral manner. More than 90 percent of the
transactions involved purchases of US dollar, as the Bank of Japan attempted to slow down
the appreciation of the bilateral yen/US dollar ("JPY/USD" hereinafter) exchange rate.
After the deadly earthquake in the city of Kobe on 17 January 1995 the JPY/USD exchange
rate experienced a remarkable surge. Initially, the Japanese currency weakened to 100.23
JPY/USD before appreciating to a 79.75 JPY/USD in April 1996. This triggered a series
of interventions by the Bank of Japan at that time.
In the opposite direction, an unprecedented level of yen purchasing took place on 10 April
1998 leading to a rebound of the exchange rate. On the 18th of June, 1998 a time-shifted
parallel US intervention occurred. Subsequently, the yen began to appreciate against the
US dollar intermittently. That finally led the Bank of Japan to intervene in the foreign
exchange markets. From January 2000 to December 2004 the Bank of Japan intervened
on 148 different days and sold more than 44 trillion yen, in the hope of propping up the
US dollar and reversing the "unwelcome" and "disorderly" yen appreciation. However, a
precise target zone band was never established.2
After April 2004, Japan experienced a record duration without an exchange rate interven-
1Since the Bank of Japan is acting as an agent, the term "Bank of Japan intervention" is only superfi-
cially correct. In July 2001 the Japanese Ministry of Finance started to release daily intervention amounts
and the direction of the intervention going back to 1991. Since then the Japanese Ministry of Finance
reports the track record of its interventions (dates, currencies involved and amounts) 30 days after the end
of each financial quarter. See http://www.mof.go.jp/english/international_policy/reference/feio/
index.htm.
2The underlying problem is that the Bank of Japan has never released a categorical breakdown of when,
why and how they intervene. Nor have they ever published any definition of "disorderliness". Ito and Yabu
(2007) and Hall and Kim (2009) have tried to determine empirically the Japanese "leaning against the
wind" intervention philosophy. They have found that interventions were more likely after large exchange
rate movements on the previous day, and that deviations from a long-term moving average have also led
to decisions to intervene. On the other hand, Japan’s government repeatedly announced that intervention
was aimed exclusively at curbing excessive foreign exchange movements, not meant to weaken the yen to
gain a competitive advantage.
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tion. However, on 15 September 2010 Japan made its first foreign yen selling exchange rate
intervention in six years and spent the equivalent of 2.1249 trillion yen on currency inter-
vention. This represented an attempt to stem the yen’s strength, which had been pushed
to its highest rate against the US dollar since 1995. By doing this, the Bank of Japan
demonstrated that they were willing to intervene to prevent the US dollar from moving
below 83 JPY/USD. The intervention topped the previous record of 1.666 trillion yen for
Japanese yen-selling intervention on a single day, set on 9 January 2004. The intervention
was triggered by speculation that the Federal Reserve would implement further quantita-
tive easing measures in order to shore up the US economy. This speculation had driven the
yen higher, which had raised concerns in Japan that it could derail the fragile Japanese
economic recovery and aggravate the long-standing liquidity trap.3 Another explanation
behind the yen’s strength was that increasing Chinese purchase of Japanese government
bonds and other yen denominated assets had contributed to the yen’s appreciation. Taking
all these things together, the yen headed towards the upper 80 JPY/USD level against the
US dollar and the intervention reversed the yen’s appreciation trend only briefly.
On 11 March 2011, a destructive earthquake and tsunami hit North East Japan and killed
thousands of people and left tens of thousands injured and homeless. The nuclear crisis
brought on by the natural disaster made the situation even worse. After the disastrous
earthquake, a sudden surge in the value of the yen to a new post-war high against the US
dollar occurred at 76.25 JPY/USD. The expected large-scale repatriation of foreign assets
to pay for earthquake reconstruction may have been a factor. In this instance, history
appears to have repeated itself: In the aftermath of the Kobe earthquake in 1995, the yen
temporarily surged by almost 20 per cent against the US dollar. In any case, a further rise
in the yen would be at odds with the needs of an economy still mired in a deflationary trap,
and add to the economic pain of rebuilding the country after the contractionary shock from
the earthquake and the nuclear disaster. In response to the yen surge, the G7 countries
carried out a large scale coordinated intervention on 18 March. A large proportion of the
intervention funds were spent by the Bank of Japan. The coordinated G7 action sent the
yen tumbling to 81.11 JPY/USD. Lastly, in August 2011, the Japanese government took
further action to tackle the strong yen without intervening directly in the FX market.
3The Bank of Japan appeared to have bought US dollars after the JPY/USD exchange rate had de-
clined to certain (time-varying) levels. On the other hand, Japan’s government repeatedly announced that
intervention was aimed exclusively at curbing excessive foreign exchange movements, and not meant to
weaken the yen to gain a competitive advantage.
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The government set up a fund of 100 billion US dollars available for Japanese acquisitions
abroad in a bid to encourage capital outflows. The action, however, did little to stop the
yen from rising.4
The article proceeds as follows. In the next section, we revisit the impact of central
bank interventions in a theoretical modelling framework. Section 3 outlines the calibration
methodology and discusses the results from the numerical exercise. Finally, Section 4
concludes our study.
2 Modelling Framework
In this section we propose a theory of exchange rate interventions that is consistent with
the salient descriptive empirical facts documented in the introduction.5 As emphasised
in the thorough literature survey by Sarno and Taylor (2001), interventions may have
an impact via various transmission channels. In their appraisal of the academic literature
they attach particular importance to the signalling (or expectations) channel and the means
by which it works. The signalling channel indicates that, through transparent exchange
rate interventions, the Bank of Japan conveys inside information to market participants
and hence alters their expectations about the future dynamics of the nominal JPY/USD
exchange rate. Interventions may also indicate the Bank of Japan’s commitment to a
specific value of the JPY/USD exchange rate.6 The informational gain arises because
central banks have at least inside information about their own future actions and policies
that other market participants do not have. Central bank interventions are therefore "big
4However, the Bank of Japan was unwilling to commit itself to a preset "minimum" exchange rate as
Switzerland did on 6 September 2011. The Swiss National Bank (SNB) announced it would buy "unlimited
quantities" of foreign currency in exchange for Swiss francs (SFr) to defend the ceiling of SFr 1.20 per euro.
Ultimately, the SNB is using quantitative easing with the aim of driving down its exchange rate to the
preset ceiling. The SFr has become a haven for investors fleeing the euro zone’s debt crisis. The SNB
decided to take this step after having attempted to drive down the SFr by intervening in the FX markets,
to little lasting effect.
5It should be noted that our presentation of the model leaves aside the normative discussion on the
desirability of influencing the exchange rate, as well as its merits relative to other policy instruments.
While the focus of our paper is on Japan, our model can also cast light on the experience of other emerging
market countries. For example, attracted by high growth rates and exceptionally low interest rates in rich
countries, capital flows into Latin America have surged once more in 2010. Many Latin American countries
have tried to prevent their currencies from rising in nominal terms and governments have launched a battery
of measures in an attempt to restrain the appreciation of their currencies.
6 Baillie et al. (2000) have surveyed the role of interventions in terms of their effects on the flow of infor-
mation and the formation of expectations. Reeves (1998) has analysed the working of the signalling channel
in a theoretical model which allows for nonrational expectations and partial credibility. Bhattacharya and
Weller (1997) have constructed a theoretical, asymmetric information model of the FX market that explic-
itly incorporates interventions. In their model, the central bank makes accurate inferences about the private
agentsť information, and agents get better but incomplete information from observing the interventions of
the central bank.
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news" on the market and convey a signal to market participants about future fundamentals.
The novelty of our approach is to combine this signalling channel with recent advances of
the exchange rate literature in modelling implicit exchange rate targets.7
Thereby we begin with the Krugman (1991) target zone model typifying many intermediate
regimes, and extend the model incorporating ideas by Klein (1992) and Chen et al. (2010).
A particular characteristic of the JPY/USD exchange rate is the long-term appreciation.
This crawling of the exchange rate over time and the standard target zone modelling ap-
proach with horizontal bands mutually exclude one another. Therefore, unlike Krugman’s
original approach, we detrend the exchange rate in order to obtain an implicit horizontal
band that allows the application of the target zone modelling approach. For the simulations
in section 3, the detrended exchange rate is then reverse engineered. This methodological
fix allows one to determine how the signalling channel has altered the dynamics of the
exchange rate at various points of time.
2.1 Basic Model
Exchange rate dynamics in a target zone are typically modelled as in the seminal paper by
Krugman (1991). The standard target zone model assumes a fully credible preset exchange
rate bands supported by infinitesimal interventions at the margins. Krugman highlights
the stabilising effect of such a target zone on the exchange rate, due to market expectations
of interventions if the exchange rate hits the bands. These market expectations generate
a nonlinear S-shaped relationship between the exchange rate and economic fundamentals.
The following equations are expressed in continuous time and solved by applying stochastic
calculus. Displaying the idea that the forward-looking nature of rational expectations
exerts an influence on the dynamics of the exchange rate, the model starts with the log-
linear asset pricing equation that expresses the logarithm of the nominal exchange rate,
ln(S(t)) =: s(t), as the sum of the logarithm of the fundamental, ln(F (t)) =: f(t), and the
expected rate of change in the exchange rate:
s(t) = f(t) + τ
E(ds(t))
dt
,(1)
7Given the presence of a signalling channel, it is a puzzle why some central banks maintain secrecy of
their intervention operations. One possible explanation for this behaviour is given in Bhattacharya and
Weller (1997). According to their model, interventions under asymmetric information may lead to perverse
responses and therefore the model provides a rationale for hiding interventions. But this constitutes a
special case which is ill-suited to explain the frequent incidence of secret interventions.
4
where E[·] denotes the rational expectations operator and τ ≥ 0 captures the sensitivity
to the expectations. For a pure free float arrangement the nominal exchange rate moves
according to the developments of the fundamentals, meaning s(t) = f(t) which is displayed
by a 45 degree line when plotting the fundamentals against the exchange rate. On the
contrary, for a credible target zone arrangement the exchange rate curve is non-linear
where its upper and lower part is bounded by the bands. If the exchange rate approaches
either of the boundaries, the public’s expectations of appreciation or depreciation cannot
be zero any longer, since the central bank is believed to prevent the exchange rate from
transgressing the band. Expressed in technical terms, the expectation operator E(ds(t))dt
in equation (1) assumes a negative value in the upper part of the zone and positive one
in the lower part. Ruling out arbitrage opportunities, the exchange rate is supposed to
approach the boundaries smoothly until it touches them tangentially. Due to the increasing
probability of an intervention and as the exchange rate depends also on its expected future
development, the exchange rate is drawn more closely to the centre of the target zone than
a free floating exchange rate.8 Hence, the influence of the expectations makes the exchange
rate curve evolve in an S-shaped pattern. However, it must be noted that equation (1)
and the above described features are based on the assumption of a steady state, where
the target zone is framed by fixed horizontals. Time-dependently moving bands exclude
an analytically derived closed-form solution for the exchange rate dynamics.9 In the case
of Japan, where the prevailing relatively low inflation rate has been forcing the exchange
rate to appreciate for many years, the assumption of a constant strong-side band would
be far-fetched. To make Krugman’s model applicable we detrend the nominal Japanese
exchange rate and then consider the dynamics of its logarithm:
s(t) = f(t) + τ
E(ds(t))
dt
(2)
where s denotes the detrended exchange rate. Which detrending technique to apply with-
out introducing a source of bias is discussed in section 3. For now, we leave this question
aside and choose a symbolical notation for the relationship between the nominal exchange
8The empirical relevance of this effect - referred to as the honeymoon effect - is examined for an estimated
target zone model for the ERM system by Iannizzotto and Taylor (1999). They find that although the
target zone arrangement is assumed as fully credible, the honeymoon effect could be of a small magnitude
only. In fact, aside from the dynamics close to the boundaries, their estimates disclose no significant
deviation from the linear relationship between the fundamentals and a free float.
9An upward moving real exchange rate band is examined by Weller (1992), where interventions occur
as soon as the price level excesses certain thresholds. Due to the non-availability of an analytical solution
the model is discussed qualitatively by considering it transferred to a constant nominal band.
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rate and its detrended version by s(t) = s(t)ζ(t) . Being a detrended value the fundamental f
is driven by fluctuations that lack any drift term but evolve according to
df = σdz.(3)
This equation states that infinitesimal changes in f are given by changes in the Brownian
motion dz that are scaled with its own standard deviation σ. To handle this process, we
introduce a function g with g(f) := s. Given the process for the fundamental as described
in equation (2), applying Itô’s lemma yields the following differential equation:
E(ds)
dt
=
σ2
2
g′′.(4)
Equation (4) implies that the logarithm of the detrended exchange rate is subject to the
second-order differential equation
s = f + τ
σ2
2
g′′.(5)
The innovation is that we solve the second-order ordinary differential equation (5) for
the special case of a free-float on the weak side and an implicit target on the strong
side.10 This provides a sound modelling framework with considerable rigour to facilitate
an understanding of yen dynamics. In particular, we seek to answer two questions. First,
how do exchange rate interventions orientate expectations towards future exchange rate
dynamics? Second, how sensitive is the dynamics of the exchange rate to prior beliefs? To
answer these questions, we extend the implicit band model to include learning about the
intervention triggers.11
2.2 The Strong-Side Band
To solve equation (5) we incorporate information about the Japanese exchange rate system.
Officially, the JPY/USD exchange rate is operated as a free-float. Indeed, the central bank
has not been forced to intervene on the weak side for more than 12 years.12 However, the
10Frenkel and Goldstein (1987) have labelled a target zone regime allowing for domestic policy discretion
without precommitting defending the exchange rate at any price a "quiet target zone".
11This focus on informational issues is in contrast to the view that interventions work via changing
demand and supply condition of the FX market.
12More precisely, the last intervention against depreciation pressure was operated on the 17th of July
1998.
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yen also faces constant appreciation pressure and a certain appreciation trend is expected
by the public and accepted by the Bank of Japan. Intensified pressure on the strong
side has prompted interventions to avoid negative exchange rate impacts that would be
particularly harmful to foreign trade. An overly strong yen could hurt Japan’s economy,
as it is an economy that depends heavily on foreign trade. This observation justifies the
assumption of a free-float on the weak side and an implicit strong-side band for solving
equation (5).
Denote the intervention triggering fundamental on the strong side by Fl. Then by applying
the value-matching and smooth-pasting conditions and substituting the fundamental value,
we obtain
s(t) = f(t) +A(Fl) exp(−rf(t)),(6)
where
r =
√
2
τσ2
,(7)
and
A(Fl) =
1
r
exp(rFl).(8)
Equation (6) would define the exchange rate dynamics fully, if the central bank announced
the exact value of Fl. It should be noted that 1r captures the difference between s and f
at the announced and fully credible strong side band. The stronger the uncertainty σ, and
the higher the sensitivity to expectations, the bigger is the deviation of the exchange rate
to the fundamentals along the 45 degree line due to more frequent/stronger interventions.
In the next section we describe how intervention policies via the disclosure of information
serve as a focal point for market participants in an asymmetric "quiet target zone".
2.3 The Outset
This section provides an outline of the initial situation. Market participants’ expectations
are assumed to depend on their perception of the present central bank behaviour and
not on past interventions. A possible justification of this assumption is that the public
has observed a very long period without any intervention, or that economic and politic
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circumstances have changed in a way that past experiences and observations do not provide
any anchoring for their expectations.
In this situation, the idea of how to include the expectation formation by market partic-
ipants into the model is based on Klein (1992). In this paper the nominal exchange rate
that triggers intervention against appreciation pressure is expected to be somewhere in the
horizontal interval [ln(S1), ln(S2)]. Specified for the nominal JPY/USD exchange rate the
intervention zone slopes downward over time. Enclosing all possible values for the implicit
strong-side band, this zone is thus to be detrended in the same manner as equation (1).
From now on let the intervals [S1,S2] and the corresponding fundamentals [F1,F2] always
refer to the normalised values forming the intervention zone in the detrended exchange
rate model.
As past interventions are excluded from market participants’ expectations and thus no a
priori information about the next intervention is incorporated, it is reasonable to postulate
that people act on the assumption of a uniform distribution of possible (unknown) trigger
values of fundamentals in the range [F1,F2]. In other words, any fundamental in the range
[F1,F2] has an equal chance of being the trigger for an intervention.13
Consider the situation at the outset in t0, where the exchange rate has not appreciated
beyond S2, yet, and the intervention zone is framed by S1 and S2. To obtain the closed
form solution for equation (5) that takes the market participants’ expectations into account,
Klein (1992) proposes to make use of a no-arbitrage condition. Thus the actual exchange
rate value must equal the expected one, i.e. s(t0) = E(s(t0)). Using E(s(t0)) requires the
computation of the expected value of A that evolves as
E(A) =
F2∫
F1
exp(rv)
r (F2 −F1) dv =
exp(rF2)− exp(rF1)
r2(F2 −F1) ,(9)
where we use the uniform distribution to weigh the parameter A in (8). Now applying the
no-arbitrage condition by calculating E(s(t0)) and then equalising it with s(t0), the value
of the exchange rate at the outset in t0 is derived:
s(t0) = f(t0) +
exp(rF2)− exp(rF1)
r2(F2 −F1) exp(−rf(t0)).(10)
Assume now that in t = t∗, t∗ > t0, the exchange rate appreciates beyond S2 by taking a
13The uniform distribution assumption also economises on the model’s complexity.
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value S∗, S1 ≤ S∗ < S2, and the Bank of Japan does not respond by intervening. This
is observed by the market participants and serves as information about the exchange rate
values that are tolerable to the monetary authorities. Speaking technically, the upper
boundary S2 of the intervention zone is then updated by S∗. Graphically, the upper
boundary shifts downward into S∗. Therefore the intervention zone narrows and every
exchange rate in this new zone becomes a more likely candidate to be the intervention
triggering one. Implementing this, we obtain the new closed form solution for the exchange
rate for time t > t∗ by using the corresponding fundamental value F∗ instead of F2 in
equation (10):
s(t) = f(t) +
exp(rF∗)− exp(rF1)
r2(F∗ −F1) exp(−rf(t)).(11)
In the limit case, where the exchange rate appreciates so far that F∗ approaches F1,
equation (11) evolves as14
s(t) −→ f(t) + exp(rF1)
r
exp(−rf(t)) for F∗ ↘ F1.(12)
For f → F1, L’Hospital’s Rule provides the lowest point of the curve being
S1 = F1 +
1
r
.(13)
It should be noted, that the second summand in equation (11) grows with declining F∗
until it reaches the limit 1r . The economic interpretation of the term
1
r is straightforward.
The wedge 1r represents the deviation from the 45 degree line and thus captures the differ-
ence between S1 and F1 at the implicit strong-side band. Comparing equation (12) with
equation (8), it is obvious that the exchange rate dynamics match, in the limit, those of
a fully credible target zone at the lower edge. Another intuitive explanation is that this
is like the honeymoon effect in the fully credible target zone model, but here it is driven
by expectations of future interventions aimed at discouraging the JPY/USD exchange rate
from appreciating too much.
As a thumbnail sketch, Figure 1 illustrates the modelling framework. It describes the
14Lowering only the upper boundary of the intervention zone, while leaving the lower boundary un-
changed, may raise the question, whether the market participants would not rather update their expec-
tations by shifting the whole intervention zone downwards. This approach assigns to every exchange rate
the same probability to be the intervention triggering one regardless of the exchange rate movements.
However, by following Klein (1992) we emphazise that the market participants think an intervention more
likely the more the currency appreciates.
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intervention zone [S1,S2] and the corresponding interval [F1,F2] of the fundamentals by
the dashed lines. The 45 degree line depicts the dynamics of the free-float, s = f. At the
outset, where the exchange rate has not moved beyond S2, the actual curve is outlined by
the segment ab. Resembling the curve progression in a fully credible target zone model, it
pastes smoothly to S2 at the lower edge. At the upper edge, however, it takes the shape
of the free-float. When appreciating over time, the curve lowers until it pastes smoothly
to the lower boundary of the intervention zone, S1. We can even tell the exact locations
of the minima. Equation (11) reveals that this point of the curve and the 45 degree line
are kept separate by the second term in the sum. This distance is thus growing with
declining F∗ until it amounts 1r for the limit case represented by curve bc. Put differently,
the more the exchange rate appreciates the more it deviates from the free-float and the
more expectations matter. Hence, all possible exchange rate curves that may evolve over
time are located in the sickle-shaped red area, abc.
F1 F2
2 a
b
c
f
f=
S
1S
S
S
1r
Figure 1: Relationship between Fundamentals and Exchange Rate with a Continuum of
Possible Intervention Triggering Exchange Rates on the Strong Side
The framework described above works on the assumption that the non-occurence of an
intervention signals the unknown edge of the strong-side band. It reveals the central
bank’s true preferences and alters market participants’ expectations. In addition, the
more the exchange rate appreciates, the higher the expected intervention probability, as
the intervention zone narrows. In the next subsection, we offer a sophisticated modelling
framework that describes the exchange rate in the aftermath of the first intervention.
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2.4 The Exchange Rate after the First Intervention
As time passes, an intervention takes place at t = T1. Numerous survey studies confirm
that speculators in foreign exchange rate markets prefer to pursue simple backward-looking
trading rules than strategies derived from mathematically well-defined econometric and
economic models, see Cheung and Chinn (2001) and Menkhoff (1998). Thus it is reason-
able to assume that the market participants make use of the information of ST1 , which is
tantamount to replacing the uniform distribution of possible intervention triggering funda-
mentals with a density function that puts more weight on the corresponding fundamental
value FT1 .
The post-intervention model also needs to account for the success of the intervention in
ST1 . An effective operation leads to exchange rate values that are larger than ST1 . In
this case, the exchange rate ST1 may serve as the new strong-side band in the public’s
expectations. On the contrary, if the fundamentals make the exchange rate appreciate
further regardless of the central bank’s efforts, ST1 is not regarded as an anchor to forecast
exchange rate movements.
A model that meets these considerations has been developed by Chen et al. (2010). The ap-
proach, which is applied to the nominal HKD/US dollar exchange rate, can be transferred
to this detrended exchange rate model. Hence, we postulate that the market participants’
expectations of the intervention triggering exchange rate in t = T2 are assumed to be con-
ditioned on the actual detrended exchange rate value being located above ST1 or beneath,
that is in the intervention zone [S1,ST1 ].
Starting with the assumption that the last intervention in T1 has been without success, we
consider the conditional probability functionP (f = FT2 |F1 ≤ f ≤ FT1). This probability
function incorporates the information about the last intervention and - in particular - about
FT1 . To simplify the problem, we assume here that the density is convex and defined by
ϕ(v) =
2 exp(2v)
exp(2FT1)− exp(2F1)
1{v∈[F1,FT1 ]},(14)
This density puts the most weight on the fundamental FT1 and all values that are close
to but smaller than FT1 . The smaller the intervention zone becomes, the more weight
is assigned to its largest value and thus the higher is the probability of an intervention.
Implementing the density in equation (14), the closed form expression for the exchange
rate in the lower range evolves as
11
s(t) = f(t) + E(A) exp(−rf(t))(15)
where
E(A) =
∞∫
−∞
1
r
exp(rv) dϕ(v)
=
FT1∫
F1
1
r
exp(rv)
2 exp(2v)
exp(2FT1)− exp(2F1)
dv
=
2 (exp(F1(2 + r))− exp(FT1(2 + r)))
r(2 + r) (exp(2F1)− exp(2FT1))
(16)
When the exchange rate value moves beyond the upper boundary without an intervention
response, this observation serves as feedback to market participants and provides the basis
for updating prior expectations. The new information is incorporated in the same manner
as in section 2.3, i.e. technically FT1 is replaced by F∗:
s(t) = f(t) +
2 (exp(F1(2 + r))− exp(F∗(2 + r)))
r(2 + r) (exp(2F1)− exp(2F∗)) exp(−rf(t))(17)
Considering the limit case for the function in equation (17), we obtain the same results as
displayed by equation (12) and (13) for the exchange rate dynamics at the outset. The
second term in equation (17) is also growing with declining fundamental F∗. Therefore
Figure 1 also sketches the post-intervention dynamics appropriately. However, expectations
play a more dominant role for this framework. The minimum of the curve is more distant
from the 45 degree line for the post-intervention model for all values except for F1. This
information unfolds when comparing the second summand in the equations describing the
exchange rate dynamics.
On the contrary, if it is the case that the central bank succeeds with the last intervention,
then the boundary ST1 appears to be a good candidate as a current off-the-record strong-
side band. This can be modelled by means of equation (6).
However, including an expectation updating process is reasonable when the current fun-
damentals do not approach the implicit band for a prolonged period of time. This might
be rationalised by changing economic developments. In this situation the market partici-
pants update by taking into account their observations after the first intervention. After
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some fixed period of time t∗, the public updates its expectations if the exchange rate has
departed from the implicit strong-side band. On the contrary, if the fundamentals have
come close to this value, no updating occurs and the basic model as in section 2.2 holds.
2.5 Information Content of Further Interventions
In the last subsection, we analyse the exchange rate dynamics assuming that an intervention
only occurs once. This setup may be unrealistic for economies for which (a) the structure
of the economy is constantly evolving in ways that are imperfectly understood by both
the public and policymakers and (b) the policymakers’ objective function may change over
time and is not fully known by private agents. For further interventions we assume that
market participants use a weighted average of past intervention triggering exchange rates
as a predictor of future interventions. Apart from simplicity, its advantage is that the
weighting may be used to specify the relevance and size of the past interventions. Hence,
we introduce a function a(t−Ti, qi) that encapsulates the information about the time that
has elapsed since intervention i and the amount of involved net purchases qi, involved.
Therewith we assume that a more recent intervention plays a more important role for
anchoring the expectations, i.e. ∂a∂t < 0. Likewise, an intervention going along with higher
net purchases is supposed to be of more significance for the market participants, ∂a∂qi > 0.
Consequently for the second intervention onwards, the upper boundary of the intervention
zone that is implemented directly after the Nth intervention, N ∈ N, N ≥ 2, in time t,
t ≥ TN , is calculated by means of the weighted average of the detrended exchange rates
that marked the past monetary operations. Thus we conjecture
STN
ζ(t)
=
N∑
i=1
a(t− Ti, qi) STi
ζ(Ti)
,(18)
where the values of a are normalised in a fashion that its co-domain ranges from 0 to 1,
a(t − Ti, qi) 7→ [0, 1], and sum up to 1,
∑N
i=1 a(t − Ti, qi) = 1. The detrended exchange
rate STNζ(t) is then used to compute the upper boundary STN := ln
(
STN (t)
ζ(t)
)
. The weighted
average exchange rate value STN yields together with S1 the intervention zone for the
mechanism in section 2.4. Equation (18) implies that the anchor for expectations can
change, depending on the current and past conduct of monetary policy.
In summary, the modelling approach allows one to determine how exchange rate interven-
tions orientate expectations towards future exchange rate dynamics.
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3 Model Calibration and Simulation
As the well-known proverb says "The proof of the pudding is in the eating". In this section,
we therefore test whether a calibrated version of the model can account quantitatively for
Japan’s experiences. In the event study, we select interventions and intervention phases
and model the associated exchange rate dynamics. In the calibrations below we focus on
"positive" interventions, i.e. FX purchases or derivative operations with similar effect.
Purchases have been by far the overriding tendency of Japanese intervention, and it is of
considerable policy interest to know whether such operations could mitigate appreciation
pressures. Figure 2 shows the nominal JPY/USD exchange rate dynamics from the year
1998 until the end of March 2011 on a day-by-day basis, where the red bars indicate the net
purchases of US dollar involved in the monetary operations by the Bank of Japan.15 The
upward facing vertical bars indicate interventions against appreciation pressure, whereas
the negative bars stand for operations against depreciation pressure. Figure 2 shows four
noteworthy characteristics. First, interventions have mainly been aimed at attempting
to depreciate the yen.16 Second, intervention dates are separated by periods of random
length. Third, repeated interventions are often carried out on several consecutive days. In
other words, interventions tended to occur in clusters.17 Fourth, one intervention regime is
characterised by small-scale frequent interventions, while another regime is characterised
by large-scale rare interventions.
In the following we focus on the exchange rate dynamics from 1999 onwards, as from that
year onwards the bank’s efforts against the pressure began to strengthen – and the US
dollar was bought and the yen was sold in every instance. Furthermore, 1999 appears to
be a good starting point for applying the model in section 2.3, as the last intervention
on the strong side was undertaken 3 years previously. Hence, we may assume that the
information of the past interventions is of no significance for the expectation formation in
1999 anymore. Below we analyse the situation at various points of time, which are marked
in Figure 2 as S′-S′v. The four highlighted dates indicate that the effects of interventions
tend not to be robust across time periods and/or modes of interventions. S′ represents
a 1-day intervention type that successfully prevented a further appreciation at that time.
15Other monetary policy instruments not discussed here (for example, interest rate changes) may also
influence the JPY/USD exchange rate, but in a less direct manner, and are normally not used with this
objective in mind.
16The sole exception is 1998 when Japan was facing contagion effects from the Asian currency crisis.
17Sequential interventions could possibly be seen as a single event as they may correspond to the same
political decision in a particular economic situation.
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On the contrary, the appreciation pressure was not stopped by the 1-day and record-high
purchase of US dollars at S′v. A sequential strategy was pursued at S′′, when repeated
interventions were conducted over a short period of time. Simulating the dynamics in S′′′
may clarify why no interference by the central bank was needed. Analysing these points
in time will both demonstrate the working of the model and the implications of different
intervention modes.18
S' S''
S''' S'v
Figure 2: Nominal Daily JPY/USD Exchange Rate (Blue Line) and Intervention Amounts
(Red Lines), January 1999 -March 2011
As usual, several problems related to the parameter calibration occur when applying a
theoretical framework to a real-world case. The determination of some parameters requires
the use of personal judgement or back-of-the-envelope calculations. The parameter values
that have a major impact are explained in detail. To start with, we assume σ = 0.1 and
τ = 0.25. By calibrating τ , it can be determined to what extent the expectations have a
stabilising effect onto the exchange rate. For τ = 0 equation (1) and equation (2) shrink
to s = f and s = f, respectively. Thus τ = 0 typifies the dynamics of a pure free float,
where no intervention against undesired developments is expected. The higher the value
of τ is, the more the exchange rate is stabilised by the market participants’ expectations
of a band at which the central bank intervenes. Because the choice of τ is a critical issue,
we shall conduct a sensitivity analysis for alternative values for τ .
At the beginning of our sample period the nominal exchange rate was 112.15 JPY/USD.
The exchange rate at the end of the sample period was 82.87 JPY/USD. If one assumes a
18Naturally, we acknowledge the problem that intervention data from other central banks are not avail-
able. This problem is mitigated somewhat by the fact that central banks always seem to have intervened
in the same direction.
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continuous trend and no fluctuations, then ζ(t) is computed as ζ(t) ≈ exp(−9.845 ·10−5 ·t),
where t is a time trend covering the period from 4 January 1999 to 31 March 2011. It
should be noted that we choose a simple specification for the trend being the same contin-
uous function for the period 1999-2011 under consideration. While this is mathematically
convenient, a possible criticism to this approach is that the specification does not allow
for time-varying trend expectations. Because this could potentially introduce a source of
bias into the analysis, we also evaluate the sensitivity of our results with respect to the
detrending technique.
Finally, the lower boundary S1 should be distant enough from the minimum exchange
rate experienced so far. Hence, we consider a calibration of S1 = 100 JPY/USD to be
reasonable at the base point in 1999.
First we show how the modelling approach helps us to reveal the perceived dynamics of the
exchange rate on 8 January 1999, which is shortly before the intervention on 12 January in
1999 took place. This point in time is marked by S′ in Figure 2, where the corresponding
upward facing vertical line illustrates the involved positive net purchase of 656.3 billion
US dollar involved in the intervention.. As no intervention on the strong side had been
undertaken for 3 years at that time, we assume that market participants did not take
into account any pre-event intervention when forming expectations. Thus, we apply the
model of section 2.3. Figure 3 shows the associated nominal exchange rate dynamics for
this benchmark case, which is reverse engineered from the detrended modelling framework.
Two business days before the intervention, the nominal exchange rate S(t) was observed to
be 111.53 JPY/USD, which approximately equals logarithmised s(t) = 4.71. In Figure 3
this is available as the dashed red line. The perceived exchange rate dynamics on this day
is given by the solid red line. The upper section of the curve pastes smoothly towards the
45 degree line. Thus our simulations are in line with the free float policy on the weak side.
In contrast, the lower section of the curve pastes smoothly at s(t) = 4.69 and therefore
S(t) = 108.85. In other words, according to the model the market participants assumed
the yen to appreciate further until it reaches a value of approximately 108.85 JPY/USD,
(≈ exp(4.69)). The 3-month forward exchange rate at that date was 110.05 JPY/USD.
The 1-year JPY/USD forward exchange rate was 106.25. This means that the perceived
maximum appreciation of the JPY/USD exchange rate according to the model is positioned
in the centre of both forward rates.19 Two days later that forecast proved almost correct
19Alternatively, one may derive the market’s perception of the implicit target zone from forward-looking
options. This literature is now very large. See Söderlind and Svensson (1997) for an introductory text.
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as the Bank of Japan intervened two days later at 108.88 JPY/USD. As a consequence,
the exchange rate jumped to 112.1 JPY/USD.
s(t)
f(t)
Figure 3: Perceived Pre-Intervention Exchange Rate Dynamics for 8 January 1999
Being based on the post-intervention modelling framework of section 2.4, Figures 4 and 5
display the calibrated signalling effect of this intervention. As stated above, the calibrations
depend upon the parameterisation of τ . To investigate the robustness of our results to
alternative τ measures, we evaluate the perceived exchange rate dynamics for τ = 0.25
and τ = 0.50. The upper boundary of the intervention zone [S1, S2] is now assumed to be
in conformity with the exchange rate that has triggered the intervention. This exchange
rate is again marked by the red dashed line. Both figures show that after the intervention,
a further small appreciation beyond 108.88 JPY/USD was expected. The signalling effect
of the last intervention is revealed by the size of the lense that forms between the dashed
red line and the minimum of the solid red curve. The smaller lens in Figure 4 compared
to Figure 3 reveals that the next intervention was expected to take place in the immediate
vicinity of the previous intervention point. Another indication of the stabilising effect
of the intervention is the counter-clockwise rotation of the red curve away from the blue
curve in the lower curve segment. Put differently, the perceived exchange rate dynamics
at the strong side is stabilised, as the market participants recall the past intervention and
incorporate it into their expectations. As expected, this effect is slightly more pronounced
for τ = 0.50.20
Another question that can be raised is whether the intervention volumes matter. As an
extension, we therefore further refine our analysis to see whether the magnitude of an
intervention operation affects its outcome. To this end, the model in section 2.4 along with
section 2.5 is applied to the situation on 9 March 2000 - being the point S′′ in Figure 2.
20This result is mirrored by the marginal appreciation of the 3-month and 1-year JPY/USD forward
exchange rate immediately after the intervention to 110.71 and 106.84, respectively.
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Figure 4: Perceived Post-Intervention Exchange Rate Dynamics for 12 January 1999 with
τ = 0.25
Figure 5: Perceived Post-Intervention Exchange Rate Dynamics for 12 January 1999 with
τ = 0.5
One possibility is that higher volumes and/or cumulative interventions convey a stronger or
more credible signal, than small volumes and/or 1-day interventions. Section 2.5 explains
how the upper boundary in the wake of past interventions is derived. In order to account
for different modes of Bank of Japan interventions while at the same time economising
on the number of parameters in the model, we specify three different functions for a: a1,
a2 and a3. All three versions of the model have one thing in common: different ways of
implementing interventions may yield different information.
First, we assume that a depends upon the normalised volume and the no-intervention
business days until 9 March 2000:
a1(t− Ti, qi) =
qi
t−Ti
N∑
j=1
qj
t−Tj
.(19)
In other words, the specification of a1 allows the intensity with which the Bank of Japan
defends their exchange rate target to play a role for the effectiveness of interventions.
Second, we assume a weighting function in which the intervention intensity does not play a
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role. Instead, only the time that has elapsed since the last intervention matters according
to
a2(t− Ti) =
1
t−Ti
N∑
j=1
1
t−Tj
.(20)
Third, the number of consecutive interventions alongside their frequencies is used as an
indicator of the intensity of Bank of Japan interventions. With every consecutive inter-
vention, market participants take the intentions of the central bank more seriously. If
interventions are being conducted in quick succession, they gain more weight.
a3(t− Ti) =
exp(i)
Ti−Ti−1
N∑
j=1
exp(j)
Tj−Tj−1
(21)
Thereby we assume that T1 − T0 := T2 − T1. The simulations may clarify whether the
mere presence of the Bank of Japan matters more or less than the strength of the signal.21
Table 1 describes the components for the computation of a1, a2 and a3 .
Date (Ti) STi t− Ti Net Purchase qi Value of a1 Value of a2 Value of a3
(in Bn US dollar)
1999/01/12 112,1 292 656,3 0,010295392 0,003046727 1,22465 × 10−7
1999/06/10 118,81 187 166,5 0,004078458 0,004757457 3,32895 × 10−7
1999/06/14 120,35 185 1405,9 0,034810163 0,004808889 4,75073 × 10−5
1999/06/21 122,3 180 927,2 0,023595233 0,004942469 5,16553 × 10−5
1999/07/05 122,38 171 783,7 0,020993125 0,005202599 7,80076 × 10−5
1999/07/20 118,93 160 179,2 0,005130284 0,005560278 0,000173493
1999/07/21 118,28 159 405,2 0,011673354 0,005595248 0,005187623
1999/09/10 109 124 640,1 0,023645554 0,007174552 0,000402898
1999/09/14 105,34 122 379,4 0,014244947 0,007292167 0,019165819
1999/11/29 102,42 70 724,4 0,047402774 0,012709206 0,002003773
1999/11/30 101,78 69 410,4 0,027244674 0,012893397 0,28323462
1999/12/24 102,96 51 370,4 0,033267806 0,017444008 0,042772862
2000/01/04 103,05 47 575,3 0,05606862 0,018928604 0,523209125
2000/03/08 106,88 1 150,1 0,687549617 0,8896444 0,123672161
Table 1: Computation of the Weighting Coefficients a1, a2 and a3 in (19), (20) and (21).
The first column gives the date of the past intervention, the second the nominal exchange
rate, the third the number of business days until the simulated day in time t, the fourth the
amount of net purchases in billions of US dollar, and finally the last three columns comprise
the weighing coefficient computed with equation (19), (20) and (21), respectively. With
21In the standard microstructure mechanism, only price signals matter (see, for example, Glosten and
Milgrom (1985)). Easley and O’Hara (1987) have subsequently introduced volume signals helping to
improve the learning process.
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the coefficients computed by a1, equation (18) yields the detrended exchange rate
STN
ζ(t)
of approximately 110.65 JPY/USD and the nominal exchange rate of 107.45 JPY/USD.
The upper boundary of the intervention zone is thus assumed to be 4.68 in the simulation.
The other weighting procedure gives the detrended exchange rate of approximately 110.18
JPY/USD, which equals 107.01 JPY/USD in nominal terms. Hence, we obtain an upper
boundary of 4.67. The intervention campaign version of the model in equation (21) is
straightforward to implement. The upper boundary of the intervention zone is computed
to be 102.84 and hence 4.63. The calibration results for the three model variants are given
in Figure 6-8. The alternative sets of model runs allows one to analysing interventions
from different angles.
Next we discuss what difference all this makes. The comparison of Figure 6 with Figure
7 indicates that incorporating the intervention amounts means that the expectations are
anchored to a slightly higher exchange rate. In other words: A larger intervention amount
improves the quality of the signal and therefore it may be concluded that larger-scale
operations should be favoured by the Bank of Japan.22 The calibrated exchange rate
dynamics for a3 in Figure 8 reveals that intervention campaigns exert a virtuous impact
on the dynamics of the exchange rate. To the extent that influencing the JPY/USD
exchange rate is by far the most important objective of the Japanese authorities, it might
be concluded that repeated operations should be favoured by the Bank of Japan. In short,
allowing for heterogeneous intervention patterns sharpens our understanding of the effects
of interventions.
Figure 6: Calibrated Exchange Rate Dynamics for 9 March 2000 on the Assumption that
the Elapsed Time and the Volume Information Played a Role
On the surface, one may simply think that a criterion for evaluating the success of an
intervention means to check the direction of the exchange rate: if the yen depreciates as a
22This is an important result since part of the literature argues that the incidence of central bank
intervention matters, but not the size of the intervention as such.
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Figure 7: Calibrated Exchange Rate Dynamics for 9 March 2000 on the Assumption that
Solely the Elapsed Time Since the Last Intervention Played a Role
Figure 8: Calibrated Exchange Rate Dynamics for 9 March 2000 on the Assumption that
Intervention Campaigns Matter
result of the intervention, then it is a success, and vice versa. However, this is ultimately
too simplistic. Even if an intervention does not reverse the trend, the policy may not be
a failure as the simplistic assessment supposes. When the appreciation trend is strong,
the yen would have appreciated had there not been an intervention. Appreciation by
the magnitude less than otherwise (counterfactual) may be hailed as a success by the
central bank. The obvious problem is the counterfactual. Where would the exchange
rate have been if there had not been an intervention? In other words, the counterfactuals
should provide genuine answers to "what if...?" questions. When we consider whether
to implement a new exchange rate policy or try to evaluate whether an intervention has
been successful, we consider the counterfactual question: "What if the FX intervention
had not been undertaken?".23 We start from the assumption that the sole difference in
both scenarios is that the intervention cluster has either occurred of has never taken place.
All else being equal, how does the exposure to past interventions in turn determine the
23"What if...?"’ questions play a central role throughout economics. Of course, our degree of certainty
about our counterfactual judgments can be no higher than our degree of certainty that our modelling
framework is correct. Furthermore, when the counterfactual posed is too far from the data at hand,
conclusions drawn from the analyses become based largely on speculation that few would be willing to
defend.
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perceived exchange rate dynamics? With the proviso of these underlying difficulties, we
calibrate in Figure 9 the exchange rate dynamics for S” on the (counterfactual) assumption
that the repeated interventions prior to S” have not been carried out. So what has happened
at S”?
s(t)
f(t)
Figure 9: Counterfactual Simulation on the Assumption that the Repeated Interventions
Prior to S” have not Been Carried Out
There are some notable findings here. The perceived boundary of the intervention zone
is now represented by S(t) = 109.61 and therefore s(t) = 4.67. The comparison with
the baseline calibration results reveals that the occurence of interventions does affect the
perceived exchange rate dynamics to a noteworthy extent. Ultimately, this implies that
market participants have altered their exchange rate expectations.
Next, we apply the model in section 2.3 to the ’eventless’ time from 2006-2010. Since
the last intervention took place on the 16 March 2004, we may safely assume that past
interventions did not play a role anymore at that time. This in fact means that the model
variant of section 2.3 can be applied. On 12 December 2008 the JPY/USD exchange rate
was S(t) = 91.29 or s ≈ 4.51 in logarithmic terms (dashed red line). This point is marked
by S′′′ in Figure 2. Given the elapsed time and the assumed gradual appreciation of the
JPY/USD exchange rate over time, the expected intervention trigger-point has shifted
down. According to the model framework, market participants expected at that date no
intervention for S(t) > 88.23 or s(t) > 4.48. Since the exchange rate still hovered above
this threshold, no further intervention was expected. This is in accord with the absence of
an intervention at that date in Figure 10.
The perceived dynamics of the exchange rate around the 1-day intervention at S′v is
displayed in Figure 11 and 12, respectively. More precisely, we investigate the exchange
rate dynamics shortly before and after the intervention on 15 September 2010, where the
Bank of Japan vigorously attempted to prevent a further appreciation of the JPY/USD
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Figure 10: Perceived Exchange Rate Dynamics for 12 December 2008
exchange rate. The single vertical red bar represents the net purchase of 2124.9 billion of
US dollar, which is indeed the highest amount of US dollar ever bought in an intervention
during the period under consideration. On 13 September 2010 the JPY/USD exchange
rate was S(t) = 83.5 which corresponds to s(t) = 4.42 (dashed red line). According
to the model calibration in Figure 11, a further appreciation to a value of s(t) = 4.4
corresponding to S(t) = 81.44 was expected at that time. The 1-year JPY/USD forward
rate of 83.22 on 13 September also indicated a further appreciation. In view of this, the
Bank of Japan undertook a huge 1-day intervention to prevent the yen from appreciating
further. The impact of the intervention upon the perceived exchange rate dynamics is
displayed in Figure 12. Clearly, both curves look almost alike. Thus, despite the strong
signal, market participants have abstained from adjusting their beliefs. This points to
policy ineffectiveness. In other words, S′v is an example that a large intervention amount
is not necessarily a guarantee of success. We attribute this finding to the firmness of agents’
beliefs.
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Figure 11: Perceived Pre-Intervention Exchange Rate Dynamics for 13 September 2010
Last but not least, we investigate the robustness of our calibration results with respect to
an alternative detrending technique. To inform the selection of an alternative detrending
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Figure 12: Perceived Post-Intervention Dynamics for 15 September 2010
method, we draw on the PPP literature. Instead of using a mechanically determined
linear trend we detrend the JPY/USD exchange rate using the Japan-US CPI inflation
differential. The replicated calibration results under the assumption of a PPP detrended
exchange rate are given in Figure 13. Comparing the results in Figure 13 with those in
Figure 10-12 reveals that the choice of the detrending technique has very modest effects
and thus our results are surprisingly robust.
s(t)
(a) 12 December 2008
s(t)
(b) 13 September 2010
(c) 15 September 2010
Figure 13: Calibrated Exchange Rate Dynamics Under the Assumption of a PPP De-
trended Exchange Rate
What do all these results suggest? All in all, it appears that there are different ways and
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detours in which signals can be transmitted. The signal can forcefully influence market
expectations as in the Figure 4 and 5, where a relative small intervention amount sufficed
to stop the appreciating trend. This holds also true for multiple interventions as shown
by Figure 6 and 7. In contrast, huge 1-day interventions such as those in Figure 12 may
also prove ineffective as measured by the subsequent further appreciation of the JYP/USD
exchange rate.
4 Conclusions
Exchange market developments and their associated economic effects constitute a defining
challenge of our time. Although exchange rate interventions seemingly went out of fashion
with the advent of inflation targeting, the recent financial crisis has put them firmly back
on centre stage. Massive interventions have been employed by emerging market countries
to dampen currency appreciation. Not least for that reason, the effectiveness of Japanese
FX interventions has given rise to an important debate. The situation is further aggra-
vated by the lack of an official stance on the determinants of intervention. This has been a
major impetus for researchers to uncover the effects of time-varying interventions upon the
exchange rate dynamics.24 Our "learning by intervention" model examines the mechanism
through which central bank intervention signals are transmitted to market participants and
ultimately impact the exchange rate dynamics. Using an asymmetric and implicit target
zone framework with learning, we model the time-varying impact of interventions upon
mean JPY/USD exchange rate expectations during the period 1999 -2011.25 The model
calibrations at various points in time clarify the workings of the model and illustrate how
Japanese exchange rate interventions have shaped expectations towards future exchange
rate dynamics. All in all, then, this provides an important layer of understanding in rela-
tion to exchange market developments. It is important to emphasise that the possibility
described above, namely that interventions shape exchange rate expectations, is just that:
a possibility. We choose to emphasise it because a general perception is that policy sig-
nalling is the most effective transmission channel of FX interventions.26 In this sense, the
24One should note that the framework proposed here could be adapted to other countries when authors
attempt to analyse other implicit target zone regimes.
25We do not model heterogeneity among FX forecasters although recent literature to the intervention lit-
erature highlights the vital interest in this transmission channel (see, for example, Fratzscher (2008)). The
reason for this course of action is that we do not analyse the so-called coordination channel of interventions.
26The results in our paper should not be used to answer normative policy questions such as "Should the
Bank of Japan intervene?". These questions need to be addressed within the framework of DSGE models,
i.e. within the context of a theoretical macro model rather than on a calibrated reduced form exchange
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modelling framework adds significantly to the literature on hybrid exchange rate regimes
and represents a fruitful avenue for future research into the modelling of undisclosed ex-
change rate corridors.
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